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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case two terms ago presenting a 
constitutional challenge to Arizona’s Independent Redistricting Commission 
(AIRC), few could understand why. As an appeal in a voting case, the Court 
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needed to affirm or deny the lower court’s decision, but few thought the merits 
of the case to be serious enough to warrant an oral argument, as opposed to 
summary disposition. Was the Court craving more election-related litigation? 
Were the garden variety campaign finance, redistricting, and voting rights suits 
not enough to satisfy the Court’s appetite? Was the principal argument in the 
case—an echo of one made in Bush v. Gore1 fifteen years ago—too 
irresistible? 
Whatever the reasons the Court agreed to hear Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (Arizona State Legislature),2 
the case presented a fresh opportunity to bat down an argument that had 
wandered around zombie-like since the 2000 election controversy. The 
argument focused on the Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the 
Constitution, which provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State 
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or 
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”3 The 
constitutional question in Arizona State Legislature was whether the AIRC, 
which was created by popular initiative and was somewhat removed from 
legislative control, violated the Elections Clause because, when it redistricted, 
it was not the “Legislature” prescribing the “Places and Manner of holding 
Elections.”4 For the appellants, “Legislature” meant legislature—not 
legislative power broadly defined or the people acting as a quasi-legislature or 
any institution other than a Congress-like representative institution at the state 
level.5 
This Article attempts to lay out the implications of that argument, 
otherwise known as the “Independent State Legislature Doctrine” (ISLD), 
because it posits that the legislature has a constitutionally blessed independent 
role in regulating elections. In Part I we give some background on Arizona 
State Legislature. Part II describes the history and precedent concerning the 
ISLD. Part III provides the most forceful defense of that doctrine. Part IV 
briefly presents the originalist and historical arguments against viewing the 
Elections Clause as narrowly about the legislature as an institution, to the 
exclusion of initiatives, commissions, or other methods of lawmaking. Part V 
presents the pragmatic and consequentialist arguments against the ISLD. 
Part VI presents our conclusions, which can be summarized briefly here. As 
appealing as a literal reading of the Elections Clause may be, its consequences 
would be both bizarre and disastrous. The ISLD, taken to its logical 
conclusion, would prevent not only redistricting commissions, but any 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652. 
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election-related action by state courts, executives, or local governments that 
might conflict with the wishes of the legislature. A range of election-related 
initiatives passed since the Progressive Era would be placed into constitutional 
doubt, as would many state constitutional provisions, since very few 
constitutions were passed by state legislatures. In short, the implications of the 
ISLD would be far-reaching and not easily contained.  
II. BACKGROUND ON THE ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING 
COMMISSION 
Passed by fifty-six percent of Arizona voters in the 2000 election,6 the 
citizen initiative that created the AIRC was advertised as a way to counteract 
partisan gerrymandering and place the redistricting process at some remove 
from the politicians who would be benefited or burdened by the decennial 
alteration of district lines.7 More specifically, the ballot summarized the 
initiative as a constitutional amendment “relating to ending the practice of 
gerrymandering and improving voter and candidate participation in elections 
by creating an independent commission of balanced appointments to oversee 
the mapping of fair and competitive congressional and legislative districts.”8 
Whether the initiative has succeeded in doing so depends on which partisans 
you ask and in which redistricting cycle. Democrats were unhappy with the 
results in the 2000 redistricting process, and Republicans were unhappy with 
the results after the 2010 census.9 
With the best of intentions, the AIRC was designed to be both nonpartisan 
and bipartisan.10 The five commissioners are selected from a list compiled by 
the State of Arizona’s Commission on Appellate Court Appointments.11 The 
majority and minority leaders in each house of the state legislature each 
choose one person from that list.12 Those four commissioners then choose a 
fifth who serves as the commission’s chair.13 
The dispute over Arizona’s congressional districts that eventually landed 
at the Supreme Court arose from the 2011 redistricting plan proposed and 
passed by the AIRC. Republicans felt the plan was biased (in both process and 
                                                                                                                     
 6 ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICIAL CANVASS: 2000 GENERAL 
ELECTION 16 (Nov. 2000), http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2000/General/Canvass2000GE.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6HXH-N9RL] (784,272 of 1,396,958 voters). 
 7 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1; ARIZ. PROPOSITION 106 (2000), 
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2000/Info/pubpamphlet/English/prop106.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/BNW8-ULYG].  
 8 ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 6, at 16. 
 9 See generally Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
 10 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 
1047, 1049 (D. Ariz. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
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result) in favor of Democrats14—so much so that the Governor worked to 
remove (and the state senate eventually impeached) the Independent Chair of 
the Commission, only to have the Alabama Supreme Court reinstate her. 
Although the AIRC’s plans were also controversial ten years earlier when it 
took its first try at redistricting—that time the Democrats objected and sued 
regarding the state legislative plan—no one then questioned the 
constitutionality of the commission.15  
After the AIRC approved final congressional maps in 2012, the Arizona 
Legislature filed suit in the District Court for the District of Arizona seeking to 
enjoin the use of the AIRC maps and to have the court declare those maps 
unconstitutional.16 The Arizona Legislature contended that Proposition 106, 
the AIRC, and its districting plans violated the Elections Clause.17 In a two-to-
one decision, a three-judge district court upheld the AIRC.18 The majority 
considered the initiative a valid exercise of the state’s legislative power, and 
noted that the Arizona Supreme Court had already held that the AIRC acts as a 
legislative body.19 The majority emphasized that previous Supreme Court 
decisions allowed states to design “their own lawmaking processes and [to 
use] those processes for the congressional redistricting authorized by the 
Clause.”20 The majority relied on the precedent of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. 
Hildebrant21 and Smiley v. Holm22 to conclude “that the word ‘Legislature’ in 
                                                                                                                     
 14 Marc Lacey, Arizona Redistricting Panel Is Under Attack, Even Before Its Work Is 
Done, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/us/04redistrict.ht 
ml?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/Z58Z-HDNP]. Republicans alleged that the Independent 
Chair of the Commission was really a Democrat in Independent clothing—with a husband 
who had done work for a Democratic state legislative candidate—and that the AIRC had 
hired a consultant who had previously worked for the Obama campaign. Id. For her part, 
the Chair, Colleen Mathis, pointed out that her husband actually worked for Republicans 
on Capitol Hill and that they had both attended the 1988 Republican National Convention. 
Id. 
 15 See generally Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
 16 Ariz. State Legislature, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.  
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1056. 
 19 Id. at 1054–55. 
 20 Id. at 1052. 
 21 Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) (rejecting challenge to a 
referendum overturning redistricting legislation passed by the Ohio Legislature). 
 22 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). Smiley v. Holm, decided in 1932, involved a 
question of whether the redistricting plan passed by the Minnesota Legislature was subject 
to a veto by the Governor. Id. at 361–63. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that 
redistricting was solely a function of the state legislature, and therefore the Governor could 
not veto the plan. Id. at 362–63. The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Minnesota 
Supreme Court. Id. at 375. In his decision, Justice Hughes explained that redistricting is 
fundamentally a lawmaking process and that the state may prescribe the manner in which 
such lawmaking is carried out. Id. at 367. As a result, the Minnesota scheme of involving 
the Governor in the process of redistricting by allowing him to veto the legislature’s 
proposal was constitutional. Id. at 367–68. 
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the Elections Clause refers to the legislative process used in that state, 
determined by that state’s own constitution and laws.”23 The legislature 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled five to four that the AIRC 
and the initiative that created it did not violate the Elections Clause.24  
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE AIRC 
A. Text and Structure 
The constitutional argument against the AIRC derives from how to 
interpret the term “Legislature” as it is found in the Elections Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.25 Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, of the Constitution states 
that: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, 
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”26 For opponents of the AIRC, 
such as the plaintiff Arizona State Legislature,27 the dissenters at the Supreme 
Court,28 and academic proponents of the ISLD,29 the word “Legislature” is 
unambiguous: it refers to “the representative body which makes the laws of the 
people.”30 While legislatures may vary in important respects, the people acting 
through direct democracy are not a “Legislature” under this view, nor is an 
independent commission when it draws congressional districts.31 If one pays 
attention to the text, structure, and history of the Constitution and its 
amendments, AIRC opponents argued, then the commission cannot have the 
power to draw congressional districts.32 
If you are a textualist, all you need to believe to be persuaded by this 
argument is that “Legislature” does not mean “legislative power.” To be sure, 
non-legislative bodies, whether the “people” through the initiative process or 
                                                                                                                     
 23 Ariz. State Legislature, 997 F. Supp. at 1054. 
 24 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2677 (2015). 
 25 Ariz. State Legislature, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 27 See Reply Brief for Appellant at 1–2, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 
13-1314), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_prev 
iew/BriefsV5/13-1314_reply_appellant.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MCY-PN9Z]. 
 28 See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2678 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 29 See Brief of Coolidge-Reagan Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant 




 30 Ariz. State Legislature, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (quoting court filings from the 
plaintiff, Arizona State Legislature). 
 31 See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2678 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 32 Id. at 2679–85. 
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even a monarch, could exercise legislative power, but that does not mean those 
entities are legislatures.33 If the Constitution and its Framers were indifferent 
as to the institution that would regulate congressional elections, they simply 
could have said, as the Constitution does elsewhere, that the state, rather than 
any particular part of state government, would have this authority.34  
Rather, in the Elections Clause, as in sixteen other provisions,35 the 
Constitution refers specifically to the state legislature. These other Clauses 
provide the best ammunition for Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, as in some 
contexts it seems pretty clear that the Constitution means “legislature” to refer 
to the representative body that makes laws.36 Most damningly, Article I, 
Section 3, the provision that provided for state legislatures to choose U.S. 
Senators, was seen as preventing the popular election of Senators.37 The 
                                                                                                                     
 33 See id. at 2679 (“The majority devotes much of its analysis to establishing that the 
people of Arizona may exercise lawmaking power under their State Constitution. See ante, 
at 2660–2661, 2671–2672, 2672–2673. Nobody doubts that. This case is governed, 
however, by the Federal Constitution. The States do not, in the majority’s words, ‘retain 
autonomy to establish their own governmental processes,’ ante, at 2673, if those 
‘processes’ violate the United States Constitution.”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash & John 
Yoo, People ≠ Legislature, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 356 (2016) (“In extraordinary 
moments, powers might revert to the people because of some abuse or abdication of those 
powers. But when those powers were deposited back into the hands of the people, the latter 
always vested them in new institutions, ones hopefully better suited to their exercise. So 
while the people were the source of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, they 
were not executives, legislators, or judges. Nor were the people the executive branch, the 
legislature, or the judiciary.”). 
 34 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 35 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2692–94 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 36 Id. (“Art. I, § 3, cl. 1: ‘The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years . . . . Art. IV, § 3, 
cl. 1: ‘New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall 
be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by 
the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.’ . . . Art. IV, § 4: ‘The 
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against 
domestic Violence.’ . . . Amdt. 17, cl. 1: ‘The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and 
each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications 
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.’” (quoting U.S. 
CONST.)). 
 37 Id. at 2677 (“What chumps! Didn’t they realize that all they had to do was interpret 
the constitutional term ‘the Legislature’ to mean ‘the people’?”); Richard H. Pildes, At the 
Supreme Court, a Win for Direct Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/at-the-supreme-court-awin-for-direct-demo 
cracy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/86TE-MLC7] (“And in some parts of the Constitution, 
at least, the framers certainly meant ‘legislatures’ to exclude direct popular decision 
making: The Constitution originally assigned the selection of senators to the state 
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Seventeenth Amendment providing for Senate elections was only necessary if 
the constitutional requirement of appointment by the state legislature 
prevented states from electing their Senators in the first place.38  
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court noted that the role of the state 
legislature can differ based on the constitutional context.39 Echoing the 
Court’s earlier decision in Smiley v. Holm,40 her opinion characterized the 
differing functions of the legislature, depending on the relevant clause, as 
“electoral,” “ratifying,” “consenting,” or “lawmaking.”41 Whenever the 
context implied that “legislature” referred to lawmaking, as in the case of the 
Elections Clause, then the state institution charged with the power to make 
laws—which could include the people acting through the initiative process or 
an independent commission—is empowered to perform the role the 
Constitution contemplates.42 For Chief Justice Roberts, in contrast, the fact 
that the legislature may perform different functions did not mean the definition 
or identity of the legislature would change accordingly: a car is still a car, he 
argued, even if you use it for some purpose other than transportation, like 
sleeping or tailgating.43 
B. Original Meaning of the Elections Clause 
The majority and dissent battled as well over the original meaning and 
intent behind the Elections Clause. To some extent, their disagreement 
revolved around the level of generality at which one should analyze the 
meaning of the Clause. Should one look to whether the institution of direct 
democracy is consistent with the democracy-enhancing features of the Clause? 
Or should one look to whether the Framers had a particular meaning in mind 
when they used the word “Legislature”? 
                                                                                                                     
‘legislatures,’ for the purpose of rejecting popular elections. It took the 17th Amendment to 
make direct election of senators possible.”). 
 38 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 39 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2668 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 40 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
 41 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2666–67. Justice Ginsburg discussed precedent 
for various legislative functions. For example, in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, the 
Court “recognized that the referendum was ‘part of the legislative power’ in Ohio 
legitimately exercised by the people to disapprove the legislation creating congressional 
districts.” Id. at 2666 (citation omitted) (quoting Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 
565, 567 (1916)). In Hawke v. Smith, “The Court contrasted the ratifying function, 
exercisable exclusively by a State’s legislature, with ‘the ordinary business of legislation.’” 
Id. at 2667 (quoting Hawke v. Smith, 235 U.S. 221, 229 (1920)). In Smiley v. Holm, “the 
Elections Clause, [the Court] explained, respected the State’s choice to include the 
Governor in that process, although the Governor could play no part when the Constitution 
assigned to ‘the Legislature’ a ratifying, electoral, or consenting function.” Id. 
 42 Id. at 2668. 
 43 Id. at 2682 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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For the majority, the purpose of the Elections Clause was to ensure that 
Congress could override state election laws regulating federal elections.44 The 
role of Congress was the chief point of discussion in the debates over the 
Clause; “the legislative processes by which the States could exercise their 
initiating role in regulating congressional elections occasioned no debate.”45 
Although the Framers may have been familiar with New England town 
meetings and the like, nothing resembling the statewide initiative of the 
Progressive Era had even been contemplated at the time the Constitution was 
written.46 But, in deciding whether the use of the initiative and an independent 
redistricting commission was consistent with the Clause, the majority 
emphasized both the general notions of popular sovereignty underlying the 
Constitution,47 as well as the concerns of some Framers regarding partisan 
gerrymandering.48 
For the Chief Justice’s dissent, the fact that no debate existed over the 
term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause was “because everybody 
understood what ‘the Legislature’ meant.”49 The earliest version of the Clause 
did not specify the state legislature, a phrase that only emerged after the 
Committee of Detail revised the original to read: “The times and places, and 
the manner, of holding the elections of the members of each house, shall be 
prescribed by the legislature of each state; but their provisions concerning 
them may, at any time, be altered by the legislature of the United States.”50 
The inclusion and reemphasis of the word “legislature,” for Roberts, was 
intentional, and at any rate should signal a decision to specify which institution 
of state government would be responsible for regulating federal elections.51 
Even the debates between Hamilton and the anti-Federalists all assumed that 
the state legislature would be in charge of election regulation.52 As for 
platitudes about popular sovereignty, the Framers instilled in the Elections 
Clause the notion that control of elections should be conducted by the 
institution most representative of the people.53 However, all “recognized the 
distinction between the state legislature and the people themselves.”54 
                                                                                                                     
 44 Id. at 2672 (majority opinion). 
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. at 2657, 2659–60. 
 47 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2674–75 (first quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
37, at 223 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); then quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 149, at 385 (P. Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1964) 
(1690); and then quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)). 
 48 Id. at 2672. 
 49 Id. at 2684 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 50 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 1 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 146 (J. 
Elliot ed., 1836)). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 2674 (majority opinion) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 61, supra note 47, at 
374 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 53 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2684 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 54 Id. (quoting Brown v. Sec’y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1276 n.4 (11th Cir. 2012)). 
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C. Precedent 
The Court has entertained a handful of cases involving the Elections 
Clause or analogous clauses that assign a certain constitutional responsibility 
to the state legislature. Before Arizona State Legislature, it had not squarely 
confronted the question of whether redistricting could be performed by a body 
other than the state legislature—either the people themselves through the 
initiative process or an independent body like the AIRC. It had upheld a 
referendum that had overturned a congressional redistricting plan55 and 
rejected a claim suggesting a gubernatorial veto of a redistricting plan passed 
by the legislature was unconstitutional.56 However, the Court had also struck 
down the use of the initiative by a state to ratify proposed amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution57 and as recently as the 2000 presidential election 
controversy, three Justices had argued that a state supreme court had violated 
the ISLD in the way that it had interpreted the state constitutional (and 
statutory) provisions related to the election recount rules.58 In short, each side 
in the Arizona State Legislature case had material to work with to support its 
interpretation of the doctrine. 
The earliest relevant precedent, however, came not from the Court but 
from the House of Representatives. During the Civil War, state courts faced 
the dilemma of reconciling the votes of soldiers cast out-of-state with state 
constitutional requirements that votes be cast in-state.59 This dilemma came to 
a head in the 1865 case Baldwin v. Trowbridge.60 The case concerned an 1864 
election for a Michigan congressional district in which the losing candidate, 
Augustus Baldwin, sued the winner, Rowland Trowbridge, alleging that votes 
cast in the election by out-of-state soldiers (which went primarily to 
Trowbridge and accounted for his margin of victory) were invalid under the 
Michigan Constitution, which required all votes to be cast within state lines.61 
The House of Representatives, which has the power under the Constitution 
to judge its own elections,62 decided to hear the case, and forwarded the 
controversy to its Committee of Elections.63 The Committee produced a 
majority report that one scholar called “the first and most comprehensive 
defense of the independent legislature doctrine ever made.”64 The majority 
                                                                                                                     
 55 Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 566 (1916). 
 56 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 372–73 (1932). 
 57 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920). 
 58 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120–21 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 59 Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature 
Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 765–67 (2001). 
 60 H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 39-10, at 1–3 (1865); see Smith, supra note 59, at 769. 
 61 Smith, supra note 59, at 769. 
 62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 63 Smith, supra note 59, at 769. 
 64 Id. Before this decision, state courts in New Hampshire and Vermont had held in 
similar cases that out-of-state votes by soldiers were not barred by state constitutional 
requirements for in-state voting, but not because of the logic we identify with the ISLD. Id. 
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report, which was adopted by the House, argued that because the Elections 
Clause vests power to regulate congressional elections in the state legislature, 
any conflict between the legislature’s election laws and the state constitution 
must be resolved in favor of the legislature.65 The majority report set forth the 
basic components of the ISLD—that the Constitution gives special powers to 
state legislatures to regulate congressional elections; that “Legislature” should 
be read literally to signify the formal lawmaking body of the state; and that 
therefore the legislature’s federal election regulation powers operate 
independently of state constitutional restraints.66 
The dissenting Justices in Arizona State Legislature adopted much of the 
logic of Baldwin.67 Writing for the dissenters, Chief Justice Roberts noted that 
the majority report determined the meaning of “Legislature” in the Elections 
Clause both from the common usage of the word at the time the Constitution 
was written and the way in which “Legislature” is used in other parts of the 
Constitution.68 As a result, he argued that Baldwin was a precedent for the 
interpretation that the use of “Legislature” in the Elections Clause refers 
directly to the state legislature.69 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court 
pointed out that the majority opinion in Baldwin directly contradicted a 
Michigan Supreme Court decision, which had ruled that “state legislation in 
direct conflict with the State’s constitution is void.”70 Further, Justice 
Ginsburg called attention to the partisan interests of the members on the 
Elections Committee when the majority report was issued and questioned the 
report’s precedential value.71  
In the cases that succeeded Baldwin, the Court rejected the ISLD. In Ohio 
ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, the Court upheld a popular referendum that 
rejected redistricting legislation passed by the Ohio Legislature.72 The Court 
found that the referendum was validly enacted under Ohio’s Constitution, 
which by an amendment passed in 1912 “reserved [legislative power to the 
people] by way of referendum to approve or disapprove by popular vote any 
law enacted by the General Assembly.”73 The Court also found that Congress, 
which by the language of Article I has the power “at any time by Law [to] 
                                                                                                                     
at 767–68. Instead, the New Hampshire and Vermont courts both construed their state 
constitutions, which were adopted before the ratification of the Constitution, to be silent 
about whether their voting restrictions applied to federal elections. See id.; see also 
Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 606–07 (1864); Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665, 
676 (1864). 
 65 Smith, supra note 59, at 771–72. 
 66 Id. at 770–72. 
 67 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2685–86 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 68 Id. at 2687.  
 69 Id. at 2685–86. 
 70 Id. at 2674 (majority opinion). 
 71 Id.  
 72 Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 570 (1916). 
 73 Id. at 566. 
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make or alter such Regulations [passed by the state legislatures] except as to 
Places of choosing Senators,”74 had expressed in the 1911 Reapportionment 
Act75 its desire that redistricting legislation be passed according to the normal 
procedures of each state’s constitution.76 Thus, Ginsburg wrote in Arizona 
State Legislature, Hildebrant “established, ‘the Legislature’ did not mean the 
representative body alone.”77 
                                                                                                                     
 74 Id. at 567 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1); see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal 
Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) (noting that the Elections Clause 
“invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but 
only so far as Congress declines to pre-empt state legislative choices” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 64 (1997))). 
 75 Reapportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat. 13. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c), the provision 
involved in Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2666, is a direct descendant of the Act 
of 1911. Congress incorporated the relevant language of the 1911 Act when it passed a new 
reapportionment statute in 1929. Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 22, 26–27 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 2–5 (2012)). In 1941, Congress added that 
Representatives “shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such 
State.” Act of Nov. 15, 1941, ch. 470, 55 Stat. 761 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a). 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the direct line between the Act of 1911 and 
§ 2a(c). See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 274 (2003) (plurality opinion) (recognizing 
past apportionment acts as “prior versions of § 2a(c)”); id. at 295 (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he 1911 statute—the one in effect at the time Congress 
enacted the present version of § 2a(c)—is almost word for word the same as the current 
statute.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–38, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 
S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_trans 
cripts/13-1314_ook3.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BM3-SNQN] (argument by the Solicitor General’s 
office that § 2a(c) is a recognition by Congress that a state may validly redistrict as 
provided by “the law thereof”); Brief for Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of 
Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 22–26, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 
2652 (No. 13-1314), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme 
_court_preview/BriefsV5/13-1314_amicus_appellee_brennan.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/K6RG-6MEB] (detailing congressional regulation of congressional elections before the 
1911 Act); Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 16–
19, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314), http://www.americanbar.org/co 
ntent/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-1314_amicus_appelle_mem 
berscongress.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6V6-29NF] [hereinafter Brief for Members 
of Congress] (similar). 
 76 Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 568–69 (“[T]he legislative history of this last act leaves no 
room for doubt that the prior words were stricken out and the new words inserted for the 
express purpose, in so far as Congress had power to do it, of excluding the possibility of 
making the contention as to [the] referendum which is now urged.” (quoted in part by Ariz. 
State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2669)). For similar readings of the legislative record, see 
Brief for the Appellees at 28–30, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/Briefs
V4/13-1314_resp_az.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/96EQ-Y9P9]; Brief for Members 
of Congress, supra note 75, at 18–23. 
 77 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2666. 
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In Smiley v. Holm, the Court then confronted squarely the question of the 
meaning of “Legislature” in the Elections Clause.78 The case concerned 
redistricting legislation passed in 1931 by the Minnesota Legislature, but 
vetoed by the Governor.79 The legislature, without having successfully 
overridden the veto by a vote, then submitted the bill to the Secretary of State, 
after which a citizen sued, seeking a declaration that the legislation was void 
because of the veto.80 The Minnesota Supreme Court first dismissed the 
action, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.81 
The Court began its analysis by noting that the central question concerned 
the nature of a state legislature’s power under the Elections Clause: 
 The question then is whether the provision of the Federal Constitution, 
thus regarded as determinative, invests the legislature with a particular 
authority and imposes upon it a corresponding duty, the definition of which 
imports a function different from that of lawgiver and thus renders 
inapplicable the conditions which attach to the making of state laws.82 
The Court then proceeded to note that “[t]he use in the Federal 
Constitution of the same term in different relations does not always imply the 
performance of the same function.”83 A state “legislature may act as an 
electoral body,” as it once did for the selection of U.S. Senators under 
Article I, Section 3;84 “[i]t may act as a ratifying body,” as Hawke v. Smith 
confirmed it does when it votes on constitutional amendments under 
Article V;85 or “as a consenting body,”86 as when it agrees to the purchase of 
land for a state under Article I, Section 8.87 
                                                                                                                     
 78 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365 (1932). 
 79 Id. at 361. 
 80 Id. at 361–62. 
 81 Id. at 363, 375. 
 82 Id. at 365. 
 83 Id. (emphasis added). 
 84 Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365. 
 85 Id. at 365–66 (citing Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920)). 
 86 Id. at 366. 
 87 On this point, see Saul Zipkin, Judicial Redistricting and the Article I State 
Legislature, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 350, 373–76 (2003). Zipkin, after an examination of the 
history of Supreme Court cases treating delegations of authority by the Constitution to the 
state legislatures, proposes a two-part test for reviewing whether “the meaning of 
‘legislature’ is fixed or whether the state can self-define its legislative power.” Id. at 373. 
The first part of the test determines whether “the task is federal in nature.” Id. at 374. 
According to Zipkin, only the task under Article V (the ratification of constitutional 
amendments) is a function in which the state legislature acts as a federal agent; in Articles I 
and II, the legislatures pass statewide legislation, not substantive federal law bearing on the 
entire United States. Id. at 374–76. The second part analyzes “whether the task [performed] 
is essentially legislative, using the case law on legislative immunity to suggest that the 
legislative power and the legislative branch are not identical or coextensive.” Id. at 374. 
Ultimately, Zipkin argues that, under this test, “judicial involvement in redistricting would 
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Considering these factors, the Court pointed out that the provision in 
Minnesota grants the legislature “authority to provide a complete code for 
congressional elections,” which “involves lawmaking in its essential features 
and most important aspect.”88 The Court therefore concluded, “in the absence 
of an indication of a contrary intent, that the exercise of the authority must be 
in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative 
enactments.”89 As a result, the redistricting legislation was, like all other 
legislation under the Minnesota Constitution, subject to the gubernatorial 
veto.90  
The majority in Arizona State Legislature read Hildebrant and Smiley 
together, arguing that it is unquestionable that Supreme Court precedent 
supports the proposition that redistricting is subject to no more or less than all 
the normal constraints on the legislative process as ordered by state 
constitutions.91 For nearly a century, courts—including the District of Arizona 
in Arizona State Legislature—have relied on Hildebrant and Smiley for the 
proposition that regulations of congressional elections are subject to the 
normal processes of state legislation,92 including referenda and gubernatorial 
                                                                                                                     
be constitutional.” Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 75, at 41–42 (Seth 
Waxman arguing for the AIRC that the Court in Hawke recognized that the meaning of 
“Legislature” is understood variously based on the constitutional task assigned). 
 88 Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366. 
 89 Id. at 367. 
 90 Id. at 372–73. 
 91 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 
(2015). 
 92 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 
1047, 1051–52 (D. Ariz. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015); see also Brown v. Sec’y of 
State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court, however, has provided 
a clear and unambiguous answer to this question, twice explaining that the term 
‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause refers not just to a state’s legislative body but more 
broadly to the entire lawmaking process of the state.”); Bagley v. Blagojevich, 646 F.3d 
378, 391 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Smiley for the proposition that “[l]egislative acts include 
signing and vetoing bills because they are ‘integral steps in the legislative process’” 
(quoting Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998))); Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 
548, 553–54 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (“[T]hese . . . cases—the only ones that we have found that 
are helpful in defining the term ‘Legislature’—have made clear that the reference to 
‘Legislature’ in Article I, Section 4 is to the law-making body and processes of the state.”), 
aff’d sub nom. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003); Ex parte Dillon, 262 F. 563, 566 
(N.D. Cal. 1920) (“Thus, when the Legislature of a state is referred to simply as the 
lawmaking body, the term may well be construed to embrace the entire lawmaking 
machinery of the state including a vote of the people where authorized by the local 
Constitution . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Am. Fed’n of 
Labor v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 619 n.14 (Cal. 1984) (“Davis v. Hildebrant held that Ohio 
could submit a redistricting proposal to referendum.” (citation omitted)); People ex rel. 
Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1232 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (“A state’s lawmaking 
process may include citizen referenda and initiatives, mandatory gubernatorial approval, 
and any other procedures defined by the state.”); Koenig v. Flynn, 179 N.E. 705, 707–08 
(N.Y.) (“There is a distinction to be drawn between the functions of a Legislature, such, for 
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vetoes, and that any flexible state distribution of the legislative power does not 
violate the Guarantee Clause, or at most constitutes a nonjusticiable political 
question regarding the Guarantee Clause.93  
However, Chief Justice Roberts claimed in his dissent that the precedents 
of Hildebrant and Smiley did not answer the question before the Court in 
Arizona State Legislature.94 Although the Court ruled in Hildebrant that the 
referendum was constitutional, that did not mean “that the state legislature 
could be displaced from the redistricting process.”95 Roberts interpreted 
                                                                                                                     
instance, as choosing Senators, making application to the federal government for protection 
against invasion, ratifying a constitutional amendment, consenting to a purchase of state 
lands; there is, I say, a difference between these functions of the Legislature and the 
prescribing or enacting of a rule or direction, which must be followed and obeyed by the 
people of the state, called the lawmaking power—such, for instance, as dividing the state 
into congressional districts and directing the people where, when and how to vote.”), aff’d, 
285 U.S. 375 (1932); State ex rel. Donnelly v. Myers, 186 N.E. 918, 919 (Ohio 1933) 
(“[Hildebrant] held that the term ‘Legislature’ means not only the General Assembly, but 
embraces the lawmaking power of the state as prescribed by the Constitution, and that an 
act redistricting the state for congressional purposes is subject to referendum.”); State ex 
rel. Miller v. Hinkle, 286 P. 839, 841 (Wash. 1930) (noting that Hildebrant supports 
subjecting redistricting authority to a popular referendum if allowed by the state 
constitution); State ex rel. v. Howell, 181 P. 920, 927 (Wash. 1919) (“[The Hildebrant] 
court passed the question of the power of the state to adopt and use the referendum as an 
instrument of legislative will ‘as obvious,’ holding that the state law, which had been made 
subject to the referendum, was valid and operative. A conclusion manifestly unsound if the 
word ‘Legislature’ means a bicameral body, and that meaning is inflexible under the 
Constitution of the United States; for, if that were so, the states would have no power to 
prevail against it whatever the form of their expression may have been.” (quoting Ohio ex 
rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568 (1916))); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 75, at 5 (Justice Sotomayor stating that “we made it very clear in Smiley and in 
Hildebrant that we’re defining legislature in this clause as meaning legislative process”); 
id. at 20 (Justice Sotomayor noting that the definition of “Legislature” as “legislative 
process” would provide simplicity, clarity, and a space for experimentation at the state 
level). 
 93 Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (citing Hildebrant 
for the proposition that a challenge to a state’s distribution of legislative power is a 
nonjusticiable claim under the Guarantee Clause); Wright v. Mahan, 478 F. Supp. 468, 474 
(E.D. Va. 1979) (“The Supreme Court has ruled that State initiative and referendum 
elections are not inconsistent with a republican form of government.”), aff’d, 620 F.2d 296 
(4th Cir. 1980) (unpublished table decision); Cagle v. Qualified Electors, 470 So. 2d 1208, 
1208–11 (Ala. 1985) (holding constitutional an amendment passed by popular vote 
requiring the legislature to receive permission from a county’s electors before enacting 
legislation affecting that county); Iman v. S. Pac. Co., 435 P.2d 851, 854 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1968) (“It has been held that whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form 
within the meaning of the guarantee of Art. 4 § 4 of the United States Constitution because 
of its adoption of the initiative and referendum is not a judicial question but a political one 
which is solely for the legislature to determine, hence courts have no jurisdiction over the 
matter.”). 
 94 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 95 Id. at 2686. 
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Smiley in the same vein. In the dissent’s view, Smiley did not mean that 
“Legislature” in the Elections Clause can mean the people of the state; rather, 
Smiley allowed for a legislative process in which the state legislature played a 
role, although not an autonomous one, in redistricting.96 To the dissenters in 
Arizona State Legislature, Smiley was a far cry from taking the legislature out 
of the redistricting process completely by instituting an independent 
commission by popular initiative.97  
Because the Constitution references state legislatures in other parts of the 
document, the Court’s interpretations of those other clauses could bear on the 
meaning of “Legislature” in the Elections Clause, a point Chief Justice Roberts 
focused on in his dissent.98 As discussed above, the majority evades some of 
these precedents (and those other clauses) by holding that the word 
“Legislature” means different things in different contexts.99 However, for 
some clauses—most specifically, an analogous clause dealing with the 
appointment of presidential electors—the precedent might be particularly 
relevant.  
The relevant portion of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution reads: 
 Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no 
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit 
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.100 
The first significant precedent addressing this provision, and the first case 
in which the Supreme Court seemed amenable to some version of the ISLD, is 
McPherson v. Blacker.101 The case involved a challenge to the Michigan 
Legislature’s distribution of presidential electors by subdivisions of the 
state.102 The Court affirmed the legislature’s authority under Article II to 
regulate the selection of presidential electors, holding that Article II “leaves 
[the question of establishing procedures for the selection of presidential 
electors] to the legislature exclusively.”103 However, the Court’s reasoning in 
McPherson was, as Saul Zipkin has noted, “seemingly contradictory.”104 On 
the one hand, the opinion for the Court declares that the state legislature’s 
power to regulate presidential elections is “plenary”;105 on the other, it holds 
                                                                                                                     
 96 Id. at 2687. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 2685. 
 99 Id. at 2668. 
 100 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 101 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 102 Id. at 24–25. 
 103 Id. at 27. 
 104 Zipkin, supra note 87, at 361. 
 105 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35.  
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that “[w]hat is forbidden or required to be done by a State is forbidden or 
required of the legislative power under state constitutions as they exist.”106 
McPherson is not cited in the Court’s opinion in Arizona State 
Legislature, and is found only once in Roberts’s dissent.107 The dissent simply 
took McPherson to mean that the power invested in the legislature under 
Article II and affirmed by the Court “can neither be taken away nor 
abdicated,”108 and that this precedent applied to the facts in Arizona State 
Legislature. 
The Court’s famous return to the ISLD in its resolution of the 2000 
presidential election did not resolve McPherson’s ambiguities. In two cases 
dealing with the crisis in Florida’s vote count for the 2000 presidential 
election, the Supreme Court referenced the ISLD. In the first, Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board,109 the Court vacated and remanded the 
Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that either the Florida Constitution’s voting 
rights protection or principles of equity demanded that the Secretary of State 
recognize an extended deadline for the recount of votes before certifying the 
state’s presidential electors.110 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted: 
 As a general rule, this Court defers to a state court’s interpretation of a 
state statute. But in the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable 
not only to elections to state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential 
electors, the legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the 
people of the State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under 
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 . . . .111 
The Court found that it was “unclear” whether the Florida Supreme 
Court’s determination that the legislature’s process for selecting electors must 
obey the suffrage requirement of the Florida Constitution, or whether the 
Florida court’s ruling jeopardized the capacity of the legislature’s scheme for 
selecting electors within the “safe harbor” provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5.112 
In Bush v. Gore,113 the Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s order 
for a statewide manual recount on equal protection grounds.114 In a 
concurrence to the per curiam opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, defended the Court’s decision on ISLD 
                                                                                                                     
 106 Id. at 25. 
 107 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2686 
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 108 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35). 
 109 Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). 
 110 Id. at 75–76, 78. 
 111 Id. at 76. 
 112 Id. at 77–78. 
 113 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 114 Id. at 103; see also id. at 104 (citing McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35, for the proposition 
that “the state legislature’s power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary”). 
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grounds.115 The Chief Justice, citing McPherson as authority,116 explained that 
the problem confronted by the Court was one of the “exceptional cases in 
which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular 
branch of a State’s government.”117 “Thus,” he reasoned, “the text of the 
election law itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, 
takes on independent significance.”118 The Florida Supreme Court’s decisions, 
by straining against the statutory scheme established by the legislature and by 
endangering the legislature’s wish to certify its electors within the “safe 
harbor” provision, unduly interfered with the legislature’s constitutionally 
mandated role to determine the manner of selecting electors.119 
The Rehnquist concurrence therefore rests on this proposition: according 
to Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, “[t]he Florida legislature directs the manner 
in which the presidential electors are appointed, and all other actors within the 
Florida system have to stay within the confines of that directive.”120 Normally, 
a state supreme court has great latitude to construe state law, but when it 
thwarts the independent constitutional authority of a state legislature, then a 
serious federal question arises.121 More generally, the ISLD logic of the 
Rehnquist concurrence suggests that when there is a collision between the 
legislature’s determination pursuant to its constitutional grant of authority for 
federal elections and a provision of the state constitution (e.g., a suffrage 
requirement), the legislature’s determination wins.122  
Considering the sui generis nature of Bush v. Gore and its political 
salience, it should be unsurprising that the decision is mentioned in neither the 
opinion of the Court nor the dissent in Arizona State Legislature. On the other 
hand, both the majority and the dissent addressed Article V of the 
Constitution, regarding the ratification of constitutional amendments and its 
implications for the ISLD.123  
Article V reads: 
 The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the 
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a 
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid 
to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
                                                                                                                     
 115 Id. at 111–12 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 116 Id. at 112–13. 
 117 Id. at 112. 
 118 Id. at 112–13. 
 119 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 120–21(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 120 Richard A. Epstein, “In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The 
Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. Rev. 613, 620 (2001). 
 121 Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam). 
 122 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98; id. at 111–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring). 
 123 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2665, 2667 (2015); see also id. at 2682–83 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed 
by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to 
the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the 
first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no 
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the 
Senate.124 
In Hawke v. Smith,125 the Court held that Ohio could not reserve power to 
its citizens to approve the legislature’s ratification of a constitutional 
amendment.126 The Court distinguished the case from Hildebrant and the 
Elections Clause context by observing that the “legislative action 
[contemplated by Article I, Section 4] is entirely different from the 
requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a 
proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such expression no legislative 
action is authorized or required.”127 The Article V delegation of power to state 
legislatures has therefore been treated by the Court in a manner quite distinct 
from the delegation at issue in the Elections Clause. In the Article V context, 
in other words, Hawke holds that the state legislature performs an 
extraordinary, non-legislative, and purely federal function (ratifying federal 
constitutional amendments), and therefore it acts entirely outside the normal 
legislative procedures established by the state constitution.128 
In Arizona State Legislature, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion read 
Hawke as holding that the legislature was performing a ratification duty 
dissimilar to the normal process of lawmaking.129 However, when it comes to 
the normal process of making laws, including laws governing redistricting, the 
power to do so is directly derived from the people.130 The dissenters, however, 
pointed to the Court’s definition of the term “Legislature” in Hawke, arguing 
that the case made clear there was an understanding at the time of the drafting 
of the Constitution that legislature meant a representative body, not the 
people.131 
In recent cases prior to Arizona State Legislature, the Court often avoided 
answering direct challenges under the Elections Clause.132 In Growe v. 
                                                                                                                     
 124 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 125 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920). 
 126 Id. at 231. 
 127 Id.  
 128 See Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (“The referendum provisions 
of state constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of 
the United States, in the ratification or rejections of amendments to it.”). 
 129 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 
(2015). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 2680 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 132 See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (dismissing Elections Clause 
challenge on standing grounds); Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093, 1093–94 
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Emison, however, the Court “said on many occasions: reapportionment is 
primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or 
other body, rather than of a federal court.”133 Nonetheless, the dissenters’ 
views in Arizona State Legislature were born out of some Justices’ desires to 
revive the pre-Hildebrant and Smiley ISLD in the Elections Clause context. 
For example, in Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar, the Court denied 
certiorari in a challenge to a state court’s redistricting plan drawn when the 
legislature failed to draw one itself.134 Even when the state legislature later 
drew a plan, the state supreme court held that the state constitution permitted 
only one redistricting plan a decade, and that therefore, the court-ordered plan 
had to remain in force until 2010.135  
The Court denied certiorari for the case, but Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented from the denial.136 The three 
dissenters would have held the Colorado Supreme Court’s reading of the state 
constitution to deny the legislature a chance to redistrict before 2010 to be an 
impermissible interference with the legislature’s powers under the Elections 
Clause—a violation of the ISLD.137 Pointedly distinguishing the case from 
Hildebrant and Smiley, the dissenters observed: “Conspicuously absent from 
the Colorado lawmaking regime, under the Supreme Court of Colorado’s 
construction of the Colorado Constitution to include state-court orders as part 
of the lawmaking, is participation in the process by a body representing the 
people, or the people themselves in a referendum.”138 The dissenters sought to 
revisit a version of the question left hanging by their concurrence in Bush v. 
Gore, but nevertheless appeared to concede that redistricting involving a 
referendum might present a different issue under the Elections Clause. 
                                                                                                                     
(2004) (mem.) (denying certiorari in a case presenting substantially the same question as 
Arizona State Legislature); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 272 (2003) (resolving 
redistricting controversy on statutory grounds). 
 133 Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Chapman v. 
Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)). Some cases have dealt primarily with the question of when 
a federal court may involve itself with state legislature redistricting. See, e.g., Chapman, 
420 U.S. at 3; Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 408 (1965) (per curiam); Md. Comm. for 
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674 (1964). Other cases discuss the kinds of 
regulation the states may pursue through the Elections Clause and propose that states may 
not impose qualifications for election to Congress beyond those already specified in the 
Constitution. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2001); U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804–05 (1995). 
 134 Salazar, 541 U.S. at 1093 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 135 Id. at 1093–94. 
 136 Id. at 1093. 
 137 Id. at 1095. 
 138 Id. (emphasis added). 
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A RESTRICTIVE READING OF THE ELECTIONS 
CLAUSE 
As the above presentation of the majority and dissenting opinions 
suggests, the text, structure, history, and precedent concerning the Elections 
Clause provided ample material for both sides of the debate over the 
constitutionality of the AIRC. To be sure, there is something to the argument 
that the word “Legislature” may mean different things in different contexts, 
and also that precedent has interpreted the Constitution accordingly. 
Moreover, as with so many originalist arguments, if one abstracts out to a 
sufficient level of generality—e.g., popular sovereignty—then it becomes less 
difficult to read “Legislature” to include “direct democracy” or at least to 
permit an institution designed to counteract partisan manipulation of electoral 
rules. But to the naked eye, there is a difference between a commission or an 
initiative vote and a legislature. 
At the end of the Court’s opinion, however, we find what we consider (and 
argued in an amicus brief to be139) the most persuasive grounds for upholding 
the AIRC against the constitutional challenge: the consequences of a 
restrictive reading of the Elections Clause would be so far-reaching and 
destabilizing that it would call into question practices that have been settled for 
a century or more.140 For not only would a decision lead to the striking down 
of other redistricting commissions, but also all state laws or constitutional 
provisions regulating federal elections that were passed by initiative or by a 
state constitutional convention would be called into question.141 The point to 
this argument is not that we should simply ignore the text because fidelity to 
the constitutional language would have perverse effects. Rather, the scope of 
the damage of a restrictive reading suggests that multiple actors in the political 
system have, for some time, believed that the Elections Clause did not prevent 
these kinds of regulations.  
                                                                                                                     
 139 Brief of Nathaniel Persily et al., supra note , at 4. 
 140 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2676–77 (2015). The majority argued that “[b]anning lawmaking by initiative to direct a 
State’s method of apportioning congressional districts” would bring various election laws 
across many states into doubt. Id. at 2676. Not only would state election laws passed by 
popular initiative be called into question, but also election rules in state constitutions, most 
of which were passed by convention or ratified by the voters, would be questioned as well. 
See id. 2676–77 (“The list of endangered state elections laws, were we to sustain the 
position of the Arizona Legislature, would not stop with popular initiatives. Almost all 
state constitutions were adopted by conventions and ratified by voters at the ballot box, 
without involvement or approval by ‘the Legislature.’ Core aspects of the electoral process 
regulated by state constitutions include voting by ‘ballot’ or ‘secret ballot,’ voter 
registration, absentee voting, vote counting, and victory thresholds. Again, the States’ 
legislatures had no hand in making these laws and may not alter or amend them.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 141 Id. 
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The debate over the meaning of the word “Legislature” in the Elections 
Clause, as such, is representative of a larger debate over the role that historical 
practice should play in “changing” the meaning of the Constitution.142 The 
critical question here, which gets lost in both the majority opinion and the 
dissent, is whether the innovation and widespread use of direct democracy to 
regulate elections should bear on the meaning of the Elections Clause.143 A 
purist might say all such laws are unconstitutional until they are relegislated by 
the state legislature or perhaps by Congress, or until the Constitution is 
amended to delete the word “Legislature” from the Elections Clause. But when 
it comes to voting and elections, the Court abandoned long ago the notion that 
constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of the Framing.144 Indeed, in 
upholding the AIRC, the Court did less violence to the text than it did when it 
created the right to vote145 or the one-person, one-vote rule146 out of whole 
cloth. At least in this instance, the Court’s decision merely upholds 
longstanding historical practices, rather than overturns them. 
A. Redistricting  
1. Independent Commissions 
Seven states—Hawaii,147 New Jersey,148 Washington,149 Idaho,150 
Montana,151 California,152 and, of course, Arizona153—have established 
                                                                                                                     
 142 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014). 
 143 See id. at 2560 (stating that “the longstanding ‘practice of the government’ can 
inform our determination of ‘what the law is,’” and this is “an important interpretive factor 
even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that 
practice began after the founding era” (citation omitted) (first quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); and then quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
 144 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (“We agree, of 
course, with Mr. Justice Holmes that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ‘does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.’ Likewise, the Equal 
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905))). 
 145 Id. at 672 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The Court [did not use] . . . its limited power to 
interpret the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, but by giving that clause a 
new meaning which it believes represents a better governmental policy.”).  
 146 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591–92 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“So far 
as the Federal Constitution is concerned, the complaints in these cases should all have been 
dismissed below for failure to state a cause of action, because what has been alleged or 
proved shows no violation of any constitutional right.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“To find such a political conception legally enforceable 
in the broad and unspecific guarantee of equal protection is to rewrite the Constitution.”). 
 147 HAW. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 9. 
 148 N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 149 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43. 
 150 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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commissions with independent constitutional authority to determine 
congressional districts.154 In these states, which comprise roughly twenty 
percent of congressional seats (eighty-eight in total),155 the legislature 
arguably does not control the redistricting process to the extent required by the 
dissent’s interpretation of the Elections Clause.156 
Independent commissions vary greatly in their composition and in their 
level of independence from state legislatures. Each independent commission 
has several features in common: a new group of commissioners is chosen 
following the decennial U.S. census;157 commissioners work independently to 
draw districts for a period of months;158 and the commission submits a final 
plan that becomes law without involvement of the legislature or governor.159 
Although each commission has its differences in member selection, 
redistricting criteria, and voting rules, their defining feature is that they are an 
institution almost completely separate from state legislatures. The participation 
of both parties in the selection of an equal number of commissioners ensures 
partisan balance even under conditions of one-party legislative dominance, 
                                                                                                                     
 151 MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14.  
 152 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2. 
 153 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1. 
 154 I use the word “independent” to describe these commissions because they exist 
independently of the legislature and have independent constitutional authority to enact their 
plans. Their membership is not necessarily ideologically “independent” of the legislature, 
since members are typically appointed by (and in some cases may even be) state 
legislators. Montana’s commission currently draws only state legislature districts, since the 
state only has one congressional seat, but it was active in drawing congressional lines in the 
past and may be again in the future. See generally MONT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, A 
REPORT OF THE MONTANA DISTRICTING AND APPORTIONMENT COMMISSION: A REPORT TO 
THE 53RD LEGISLATURE (Dec. 1992), http://leg.mt.gov/content/committees/interim/1999_ 
2000/districting_and_apportionment/1990rept.pdf [https://perma.cc/524A-VLSJ]. Prior to 
the 1990 census, Montana had two congressional districts, and its commission drew their 
boundaries in 1974 and 1983. Id. at 3, 6–8. If Montana gains an additional congressional 
seat in the future, the commission will automatically become active once again in 
apportioning congressional districts. See MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14. 
 155 KRISTIN D. BURNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CONGRESSIONAL 
APPORTIONMENT: 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 5 (Nov. 2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010 
/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/38SM-FESJ]. 
 156 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2687 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). To be precise, those states together contain eighty-
nine congressional districts. Because Montana currently has only one district, its 
commission did not draw districts this cycle; but it has in the past and may again in the 
future. See MONT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 154, at 3. 
 157 See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2(1); WASH. CONST. 
art. II, § 43(1). 
 158 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(3). 
 159 See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(4); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2(3). 
2016] WHEN IS A LEGISLATURE NOT A LEGISLATURE? 711 
which currently exist in all commission states except Washington.160 If non-
commission states are any guide, the plans that emerge from these 
commissions are almost certainly different than those that would emerge from 
one-party states in which minority party interests can be ignored altogether 
and the legislature as an institution acts without restraint.161 Indeed, the whole 
purpose of redistricting commissions is to create some distance between the 
commissioners and the elected legislature as it traditionally operates. 
All seven independent state commissions appear to exclude the legislature 
to more or less the same extent as Arizona’s commission. However, 
commissions in New Jersey,162 Idaho,163 and Washington164 were enacted via 
legislatively referred constitutional amendments. In each of these states the 
legislature is now barred from changing the law and can do nothing if it 
objects to a plan developed by the commission—or to the commission’s 
existence in the first place. In other words, when the commissions craft plans 
in those states, “the Legislature” does not “prescribe” “the Manner” of 
congressional elections. Moreover, by this argument, four other commissions 
would be suspect. Commissions in California and Arizona—both created by 
voter-initiated constitutional amendments, with no legislative approval165—
would definitely be unconstitutional under the approach taken by the Roberts 
dissent. Notably, the commissions of Montana and Hawaii date to 
constitutional provisions drafted by constitutional conventions (in 1972 in 
Montana and in 1978 in Hawaii) and approved by subsequent popular 
referenda—and therefore also received no legislative approval.166 
It might have been possible for the Court to adopt an interpretation of the 
Elections Clause that would have distinguished commissions based on the role 
the legislature plays in selecting members, or based on the restrictions upon 
service by legislators (i.e., if a commission were merely an agent of the 
legislature, perhaps the legislature is still sufficiently in charge for Elections 
                                                                                                                     
 160 See Statevote 2014: Election Results, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 19, 
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/statevote-2014-post-election-
analysis635508614.aspx [https://perma.cc/M3SG-P8U6]. 
 161 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
477, 488–92. 
 162 N.J. PUBLIC QUESTION NO. 1 (1995), http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/election-
results/1995-general-election-public-questions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C2Q-4WA7]. 
 163 IDAHO S.J. RES. 105 (1994), https://www.legislature.idaho.gov/redistricting/1993SJ 
R105.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW94-R5AM]. 
 164 WASH. S.J. RES. 103 (1983), https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/Voters’%20 
Pamphlet%201983.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7VQ-B4CU]. 
 165 CAL. PROPOSITION 11 (2008), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/initiatives/i746_07-
0077_Initiative.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z6S-ZAQ4]; ARIZ. PROPOSITION 106 (2000), 
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2000/Info/pubpamphlet/English/prop106.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BNW8-ULYG]. 
 166 MONT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 154, at 7–8; The Constitution of the State 
of Hawaii, HAW. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, http://lrbhawaii.org/con/ [https://perma.cc/8P3R-
NDME]. 
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Clause purposes). New Jersey allows legislators to fill twelve of thirteen 
available seats,167 while Hawaii allows them to fill eight of nine—but only if 
they will not run for reelection or a congressional seat for the next two 
elections.168 All other states bar service by legislators entirely. In terms of a 
legislature’s role in selection, only Washington allows its legislators to appoint 
all commission members;169 most other states mandate that at least one 
member be selected by other commission appointees,170 many give power to 
state party chairs,171 and California172 and Arizona173 endow nonpartisan state 
agencies with power to screen candidates. Notably, no state gives the 
legislature as an institution any role in selecting candidates; rather, specific 
legislators holding leadership positions make the decisions. 
California’s commission, which excludes the state legislature as much as, 
or more, than Arizona’s in all respects, would have fallen if the AIRC did. 
Regarding the method of enactment, constitutional conventions in Montana 
and Hawaii excluded the legislature just as much as voter-initiated 
amendments, while in the three other states the consent of the legislature 
decades ago hardly seems that relevant today given that the current legislature 
is barred from changing the law. Regarding the legislature’s role in 
appointments, note that even in Arizona, four of the five members are selected 
by the majority and minority leaders of each house of the state legislature.174 If 
Arizona’s commission is unconstitutional, then the others that allow for a 
similarly limited role of appointment by legislators would be unconstitutional 
as well. 
2. Backup Commissions 
Three states—Connecticut,175 Indiana,176 and Maine177—empower an 
entity other than the legislature to draw districts, but only if the state 
legislature fails to do so on its own. Connecticut and Indiana both establish 
commissions for this purpose; Connecticut’s is appointed by legislative leaders 
and commences work when the legislature misses a specific deadline,178 while 
Indiana’s is composed of legislators and is established when the legislature 
                                                                                                                     
 167 N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2(1)(a)–(c).  
 168 HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2, para. 1. 
 169 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(2). 
 170 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2, para. 1; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); N.J. 
CONST. art. II, § 2(1)(c). 
 171 See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2(1)(b)(5). 
 172 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c). 
 173 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1(4). 
 174 Id. § 1(6). 
 175 CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6. 
 176 IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2(a) (West 2006). 
 177 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206(2) (2008 & Supp. 2015). 
 178 CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b). 
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adjourns without creating a plan.179 Maine mandates that its state supreme 
court create districts if a constitutional deadline passes and the legislature has 
failed to produce a plan.180 
In Indiana and Maine, the backup mechanisms were created by statute, and 
can therefore be repealed by the legislature at any time. For this reason, they 
likely would not be threatened by a narrow interpretation of the Elections 
Clause. Connecticut’s backup mechanism, though, was created by a 
legislatively referred constitutional amendment. On the one hand, the state 
legislature consented in the relevant amendment’s original passage and may—
by passing its own plan—prevent the amendment’s provisions from ever going 
into effect. In addition, eight of the commission’s nine members may be (and 
typically are) state legislators. On the other hand, the legislature has no ability 
to repeal the amendment, and once the backup commission starts work, the 
legislature as an institution has no role in creating districts and no ability to 
halt the process—much like in Arizona. In both 2001 and 2011, the legislature 
failed to draw its own districts, and the commission began work.181 
3. Other Restrictions on Redistricting 
At least three state constitutions enumerate criteria that state legislatures 
must use in drawing congressional districts. Virginia’s requires that “[e]very 
electoral district shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory and 
shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as is practicable, representation in 
proportion to the population of the district.”182 Florida’s contains more 
specific and stringent mandates:  
 (a) No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the 
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and districts shall 
not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal 
opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political 
process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and 
districts shall consist of contiguous territory.  
 (b) Unless compliance with the standards in this subsection conflicts with 
the standards in subsection (a) or with federal law, districts shall be as nearly 
equal in population as is practicable; districts shall be compact; and districts 
                                                                                                                     
 179 IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2(a). 
 180 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206(2). 
 181 In 2001, the commission successfully created new districts. See Reapportionment 
Commission (Draft) Meeting Minutes, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING PROJECT 
(Dec. 21, 2001), http://www.cga.ct.gov/red2011/2001_Minutes_10.asp [https://perma.cc/T894-
Y6NF]. In 2011, the commission was deadlocked, and the task fell to the state supreme 
court and its appointed Special Master (some law professor). In re Reapportionment 
Comm’n, 36 A.3d 661, 661 (Conn. 2012). 
 182 VA. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
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shall, where feasible, utilize existing political and geographical 
boundaries.183 
Florida’s language was already challenged on Elections Clause grounds in 
Brown v. Secretary of State of Florida and upheld.184 In Brown, the court 
wrote that the Florida amendment simply “provide[s] some general guidance 
to the legislature regarding the exercise of its redistricting power,” and the 
Arizona State Legislature attempted to distinguish its case from Brown rather 
than challenge Brown’s holding.185 Despite that, the language in both Florida 
and Virginia seemed ripe for a fresh challenge if the Court had held against the 
AIRC. Both of the above requirements were put into place without the consent 
of state legislatures; Virginia’s language dates to the enactment of the state’s 
current constitution in 1971,186 while Florida’s was created by a voter-initiated 
constitutional amendment in 2010.187 These laws cannot be repealed by the 
states’ legislatures, and either could be grounds for a lawsuit challenging any 
redistricting plan a legislature produced. 
B. Other Election Regulations 
Because Arizona and other states that employ direct democracy prevent 
state legislatures from overturning citizen initiatives, many election laws—
even apart from redistricting—would violate the restrictive interpretation of 
the Elections Clause.188 Try as one might to limit this constitutional theory to 
independent redistricting commissions or to redistricting, in general, the 
principle cannot be so easily cabined.189 If Arizona’s redistricting commission 
                                                                                                                     
 183 FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20 (footnote omitted). 
 184 Brown v. Sec’y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 185 Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 41 (“Arizona law does not simply ‘provide 
some general guidance to the legislature regarding the exercise of its redistricting power.’ 
Brown v. Sec’y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2012) (upholding initiative 
measure establishing standards legislature must follow when redistricting). Instead, it 
‘eviscerate[s]’ the Legislature’s ‘constitutionally delegated power’ and ‘exclude[s] the 
legislature from the redistricting process.’ Id.” (alterations in original)). 
 186 See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6. Virginia’s constitution was drafted by the state’s 
legislature and approved by popular vote. See Constitutions of the Several States, GREEN 
PAPERS, http://www.thegreenpapers.com/slg/constitution.phtml [https://perma.cc/38PR-7SU6] 
(last modified Feb. 22, 2014). 
 187 FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20 & n.1 (noting that this amendment passed in 2010 as 
Amendment No. 6 and was proposed by initiative petition). 
 188 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. I, § 1(6); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c); see also 
Comparison of Statewide Initiative Processes, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/A_Comparison_of_Statewide_IandR_Processes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VQG2-G4XQ]. 
 189 Indeed, a good argument could be made that congressional redistricting is at the 
margin of election regulations captured by the Elections Clause’s reference to the “Times, 
Places and Manner of holding elections.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The line drawing 
process does not affect the times of elections, nor does it “prescribe” the “places” where 
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is unconstitutional because the legislature did not draw the districts or delegate 
authority to the commission to do so, so too are the many election law 
initiatives that were not passed by the legislature and might contradict laws the 
legislature might pass on its own.  
1. Voter-Initiated Amendments & Statutes 
Voter-initiated constitutional amendments—like Arizona’s Prop. 106—
allow voters to amend state constitutions via popular vote, without involving 
legislatures or governors.190 Eighteen states allow voter-initiated 
amendments.191 State legislatures cannot undo voter-initiated amendments 
except by passing subsequent amendments of their own, which in all eighteen 
states requires a vote of the people.192 
Twenty-four states (including six that do not permit voter-initiated 
amendments) allow voter-initiated state statutes, which permit voters to enact 
new laws without legislative consent.193 The key difference between initiated 
statutes and initiated amendments is that statutes are easier to repeal, though 
the degree to which voter-initiated statutes bind legislatures varies by state.194 
Ten states’ constitutions specifically restrict the legislature’s ability to repeal 
or amend an initiated statute: two (including Arizona) bar it entirely;195 three 
require a supermajority of both houses;196 and five do one or the other but only 
for a set period of time.197 In the remaining fourteen states without 
                                                                                                                     
elections are “held.” At most, one might say redistricting prescribes the “manner” of 
congressional elections, but it does not regulate the manner in which such elections are 
“held.” A strict interpretation of the Elections Clause might only be limited to the timing of 
elections, the location of polling places, and other facets of administration on the days 
elections are held.  
 190 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art IV, pt. I, § 1(5). 
 191 State I&R, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/33N6-JWEQ]. 
 192 Id. In fact, “[e]very state except Delaware requires a popular vote to approve 
constitutional amendments.” Id.; see also DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
 193 State I&R, supra note 191. 
 194 Limiting the Legislature’s Power to Amend and Repeal Initiated Statutes, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/limits-on-
legislative-power.aspx [https://perma.cc/R48U-4SEB] (last updated June 28, 2011) 
[hereinafter Limiting the Legislature’s Power]. 
 195 California bars repeal or amendment in perpetuity unless voters approve. CAL. 
CONST. art. II, § 10. Arizona bars repeal and permits amendment only with a three-quarters 
supermajority and when it “furthers the purposes” of the measure. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 
I, § 1(6). 
 196 Arkansas and Nebraska require a two-thirds supermajority to amend or repeal. 
ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2. Michigan requires a three-quarters 
supermajority to amend or repeal. MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9. 
 197 Alaska bars repeal for two years after the effective date and allows amendment at 
any time. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. Nevada bars repeal or amendment for three years. 
NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2(3). Wyoming bars repeal for two years and allows amendment 
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constitutional restraints, the legislature can repeal or amend voter-initiated 
statutes at will.198 
The following is a sample of laws currently in effect that regulate federal 
elections, were passed without the consent of the legislature, and now cannot 
be repealed by the legislature alone199: 
 Ohio Amendment 2 (1949): Amended the constitution to bar “party 
tickets” on ballots and mandates that voters choose individual 
candidates.200 
 Arkansas Amendment 50 (1962): Amended the constitution to allow 
the use of voting machines.201 (Previously, an Arkansas constitutional 
provision could be construed to require the use of paper ballots in all 
elections.202) 
 Ohio Issue 1 (1977): Amended the constitution to set the time period 
that a person must be a state resident prior to an election in order to 
vote to thirty days.203 (Previously there had been no deadline.204)  
 Oregon Measure 13 (1986): Amended the constitution to close voter 
registration twenty days before an election.205 (Previously there had 
been no deadline.206) 
                                                                                                                     
at any time. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52(f). North Dakota requires a two-thirds 
supermajority to amend or repeal for seven years. N.D. CONST. art. III, § 8. Washington 
requires a two-thirds supermajority to amend or repeal for two years. WASH. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1(c). 
 198 This includes Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah. Limiting the 
Legislature’s Power, supra note 194; see also J.E. Macy, Annotation, Power of Legislative 
Body to Amend, Repeal, or Abrogate Initiative or Referendum Measure, or to Enact 
Measure Defeated on Referendum, 33 A.L.R.2d 1118, § 2 (1954) (“In the absence of 
special constitutional restraint, either [the legislature or the people] may amend or repeal an 
enactment by the other.”). 
 199 See also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 75, at 10 (Justice Kagan noting 
that “there are zillions of these laws”). 
 200 OHIO CONST. art. V, § 2a; Amendment and Legislation: Proposed Constitutional 
Amendments, Initiated Legislation, and Laws Challenged by Referendum, Submitted to the 
Electors, OHIO SEC’Y ST. 9, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/historical 
/issuehist.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J7E-G462] (last updated May 23, 2016) [hereinafter 
Amendment and Legislation]. 
 201 ARK. CONST. amend. 50 (“All elections by the people shall be by ballot or by voting 
machines which insure the secrecy of individual votes.”). 
 202 ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 3 (“All elections by the people shall be by ballot. 
Every ballot shall be numbered in the order in which it shall be received, and the number 
recorded by the election officers, on the list of voters opposite the name of the elector who 
presents the ballot.”). 
 203 OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1; Amendment and Legislation, supra note 200, at 17. 
 204 OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (“Every citizen of the United States, of the age of eighteen 
years, who has been a resident of the state . . . such time as may be provided by law . . . is 
entitled to vote at all elections.”) (amended 1977). 
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 Mississippi Initiative 27 (2011): Amended the constitution to 
require—with limited exceptions—that voters present government-
issued photo identification in order to vote in person.207 (The initiative 
was placed on the ballot by petition after the state legislature had 
considered a similar bill but failed to enact it.208) 
 Arizona Prop. 200 (2004): Enacted a statutory requirement that voters 
present identification—either one form of identification with a 
photograph, or two forms with just name and address—in order to 
vote in person.209 
By definition, each of these laws was passed without legislative consent 
and cannot be repealed by the legislature alone. Therefore, if the Court had 
construed the Elections Clause narrowly, it is hard to imagine how they would 
not have been constitutionally vulnerable.  
There are also state laws (typically statutes) that were passed by initiative 
(without the consent of the legislature) but now can be repealed by the 
legislature through standard legislation. Here is a sampling: 
 Oregon Measure 60 (1998): Enacted a statutory requirement that 
biennial primary and general elections be conducted entirely by 
mail.210 (The legislature later amended the statute to require that all 
elections be conducted by mail.211)  
 Alaska Measure 4 (2004): Enacted a statutory requirement that vacant 
U.S. Senate seats be filled by special election rather than gubernatorial 
appointment in most circumstances.212 (The statute was placed on the 
ballot after Alaska Governor Frank Murkowski appointed his 
                                                                                                                     
 205 OR. CONST. art. II, § 2(c); OR. MEASURE 13 (1986), 
http://library.state.or.us/repository/2010/201003011350161/ORVPGenMari1986.pdf#page=6
8 [https://perma.cc/6VJ3-TE4P]. 
 206 OR. MEASURE 13 (1986), http://library.state.or.us/repository/2010/201003011350 
161/ORVPGenMari1986.pdf#page=68 [https://perma.cc/6VJ3-TE4P]. 
 207 MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 249-A; MISS. INITIATIVE 27 (2011), https://www.sos.ms.gov 
/elections/initiatives/InitiativeInfo.aspx?IId=27 [https://perma.cc/8CCP-C53X]. 
 208 Andrea Williams, Voter Identification Petition Drive, WTOK (May 25, 2009), 
http://www.wtok.com/news/headlines/45993602.html [https://perma.cc/N43L-P8PN]. 
 209 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-579 (2015); ARIZ. PROPOSITION 200 (2004), 
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2004/Info/PubPamphlet/english/prop200.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/GX5R-ASXP]. Another part of the proposition, requiring proof of citizenship to register 
to vote in federal elections, was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2013. Arizona v. 
Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013). 
 210 OR. MEASURE 60 (1998), http://library.state.or.us/repository/2010/20100301135 
0161/ORVGenMari1998m.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4L5-CQMW]. 
 211 OR. REV. STAT. § 254.465 (2015) (as amended in 2007). 
 212 ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.140 (2014); ALASKA MEASURE 4 (2004), 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/oep/2004/2004_oep_reg_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ8L-
G32N]. 
718 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:4 
daughter, Lisa Murkowski, to fill the Senate seat he vacated upon 
becoming governor.213) 
 Washington Initiative 872 (2004): Enacted a statutory requirement that 
primary elections for state and federal offices be conducted using a 
“top-two,” nonpartisan system.214 (The proposition was placed on the 
ballot after the state legislature effectively gave Washington Governor 
Gary Locke the ability to choose—via line-item veto—between a top-
two system and a party-based system, and he chose the latter.215) 
Each of these statutes was passed without the legislature’s consent yet is 
still binding law in the state. Although a legislature could vote to repeal them, 
it would likely need gubernatorial approval to do so successfully.216 Therefore, 
it is possible that they would run afoul of a narrow construction of the 
Elections Clause as well.217  
2. Original Constitutional Provisions 
In forty-six states, the current state constitution was drafted by a 
constitutional convention without direct involvement by the state 
legislature.218 (In the remainder—Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and 
Virginia—current constitutions were drafted by the state legislature and 
ratified by a vote of the people.219) In most of the forty-six convention states, 
the state constitutions include many regulations of congressional and 
presidential elections.220 A convention is not a “Legislature”; therefore, those 
provisions would fall by the same rule that would have made the AIRC 
constitutionally vulnerable. 
                                                                                                                     
 213 See Associated Press, Alaska Judge Orders 517,000 Ballots Reprinted, 
Redistributed for Nov. 2 Election, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/polit 
icselections/state/alaska/2004-09-29-ballots_x.htm [https://perma.cc/Q44P-993M] (last 
updated Sept. 30, 2004). 
 214 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.36.170 (West 2014) (as amended in 2013); WASH. 
INITIATIVE 872 (2004), https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i872.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/97E8-JDNS]. 
 215 See News Release: Gov. Gary Locke Signs Bill Enacting Montana Primary Election 
System, OFF. GOVERNOR GARY LOCKE (Apr. 1, 2004), http://www.digitalarchives.wa.gov/ 
governorlocke/press/press-view.asp?pressRelease=1575&newsType=1 [https://perma.cc/ 
U5CL-ZY59]. 
 216 See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (“Every act which shall have passed the 
legislature shall be, before it becomes a law, presented to the governor. If he approves, he 
shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it . . . .”). 
 217 The measures in Oregon and Washington have both been amended by the 
legislature in ways that preserved their spirit but changed their language. See OR. REV. 
STAT. § 254.465 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.36.170 (West 2014). 
 218 See Constitutions of the Several States, supra note 186. 
 219 Id. 
 220 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 1; OR. CONST. art. II, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. 
VI, § 1A (repealed 2011). 
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After the Declaration of Independence, the original thirteen states each 
adopted constitutions through constitutional conventions.221 The remaining 
thirty-seven states each adopted their original constitutions by constitutional 
convention roughly around the time of their admission to the union.222 
Eighteen states now retain their original constitutions, while the remainder 
have enacted one or more subsequent constitutions.223 In total, forty-six states 
have constitutions that were drafted by constitutional conventions, while four 
have constitutions that were drafted by the legislature.224 (In both types of 
states, constitutions were generally approved by popular vote.225) 
As for the role of Congress, some states (e.g., Hawaii) adopted 
constitutions without any congressional authority prior to admission into the 
union; others (e.g., Oklahoma) were admitted to the union prior to the creation 
of a constitution and subsequently adopted one under conditions set by 
Congress; and others (e.g., Arizona) adopted constitutions as part of the 
process of admission, in some cases making changes after Congress refused to 
admit them with their constitutions as written.226 
In the eighteen states still using their first constitutions, the state 
legislature did not exist (at least in its present form) until the constitution was 
adopted, so inherently it could not have consented in its enactment. In the 
other states, the state legislature generally had some role in the creation of the 
convention, whether by bringing it into existence, supervising the choice of its 
members, or granting its mandate.227 However, once convened, each of these 
conventions had independent authority to enact a constitution—none of the 
constitutions they created were subject to a vote by the state legislature. 
Similarly, though Congress approved the admission of new states and at times 
requested changes to their constitutions, it cannot be said to have had any 
direct role in approving individual provisions. In sum, forty-six state 
constitutions were drafted without legislative or congressional consent. 
In the other four states, legislatures drafted constitutions themselves and 
then submitted them for a vote of the people. The legislatures of Virginia, 
Florida, and North Carolina did so using the basic power of amendment 
contained in their constitutions,228 while Georgia’s did so using a specific 
                                                                                                                     
 221 See Constitutions of the Several States, supra note 186. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See id. 
 227 See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1–4 (stipulating that the Connecticut state 
legislature may call a constitutional convention, select its membership, and determine its 
dates—but also that it must submit the convention’s proposals to voters once the 
convention adjourns). 
 228 FLA. CONST. art XI, § 1; Register of the Papers of A. E. Dick Howard for the 
Virginia Commission for Constitutional Revision 1969-71, U. VA. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/main/Howard,+Dick [https://perma.cc/Z92H-YSYU]; David 
Walbert, The 1971 Constitution, LEARN NC, http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchist-
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power granted to the legislature to enact a wholly new constitution.229 In either 
case, the entire constitution can be considered to have been enacted with the 
consent of the state legislature, and its provisions are likely safe from a 
challenge based on the Elections Clause. 
Nearly all state constitutions have an article or section specifically 
governing elections,230 and most of these contain one or more original 
(unamended) provisions that implicate the Elections Clause.231 Here is a 
sample of constitutional provisions that are (a) currently active, (b) implicate 
the Elections Clause, and (c) date to the adoption of state constitutions by 
convention: 
 “Manner” of Voting: At least thirty-six states require that voting by 
electors be “secret,” “by ballot,” or “by secret ballot,” and many 
additionally require voting by elected officials—e.g., for U.S. Senators 
prior to 1913—be done by voice.232 These are particularly notable 
because, at the time the Constitution was ratified, the issue of whether 
votes were cast using written ballots (which could be kept secret) or 
by vocal declarations (which could not) was broadly thought to be at 
the heart of the power the Elections Clause conveyed over 
“Manner.”233 
                                                                                                                     
postwar/6100 [https://perma.cc/6MUA-T9DG]. For the relevant provisions, see FLA. 
CONST. of 1865, art. XVII, §§ 1–2; N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. XIII, §§ 1–2; VA. CONST. art. 
XII, §§ 1–2. 
 229 LaVerne W. Hill & Melvin B. Hill, Georgia Constitution, NEW GA. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/georgia-
constitution [https://perma.cc/5528-THGR] (last modified Aug. 2, 2016). For the relevant 
provision, see GA. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
 230 See infra Table 4; see also MINN. CONST. art. VII; N.J. CONST. art. II; OKLA. 
CONST. art. III; R.I. CONST. art. IV; VT. CONST. §§ 43–55. Exceptions are Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire. See MASS. CONST; N.H. CONST. 
 231 See infra Table 4. 
 232 For information on specific provisions and their provenance, by state, see Table 4, 
below. 
 233 For James Madison, the decision “[w]hether the electors should vote by ballot or 
vivâ voce” was quintessentially one covered by the Elections Clause. 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 240 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (quoting 
James Madison); see also 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 71 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863) (quoting 
delegate of the North Carolina ratifying convention as defining “manner” in the Elections 
Clause as “only enabl[ing states] to determine how these electors shall elect—whether by 
ballot, or by vote, or by another way”). Yet even some of the earliest state constitutions, 
such as the 1812 Louisiana Constitution, the 1776 and 1790 Pennsylvania Constitutions, 
and the 1796 Tennessee Constitution contained such provisions protecting a secret ballot, 
thereby placing the manner of voting out of the elected legislature’s reach. LA. CONST. of 
1812, art. VI, § 13 (“In all elections by the people, and also by the Senate and House of 
Representatives jointly or separately, the vote shall be given by ballot.”); PA. CONST. of 
1790, art. III, § 2 (“All elections shall be by ballot, except those by persons in their 
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 Threshold for Victory: Three states—Arizona,234 Montana,235 and 
Oregon236—mandate a plurality of votes as the standard for victory in 
all elections (excluding runoffs). 
 Absentee Voting: Five states—Hawaii,237 Louisiana,238 North 
Dakota,239 Pennsylvania,240 and Michigan241—require state 
legislatures to provide for absentee voting. 
 Voter Registration: Seven states—Mississippi,242 North Carolina,243 
Virginia,244 West Virginia,245 Wyoming,246 Washington,247 and 
Michigan248—require electors to be registered in order to vote, and/or 
require the legislature to provide for registration of voters.249 
(Mississippi additionally bars registration within four months of an 
election,250 while Virginia requires that registration be permitted until 
at least thirty days before an election.251) 
                                                                                                                     
representative capacities, who shall vote viva voce.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 32 
(“All elections, whether by the People or in General Assembly, shall be by ballot . . . .”); 
TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. III, § 3 (“All elections shall be by ballot.”). 
 234 ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 7(7). The provision was amended in 1988 by ARIZ. 
PROPOSITION 105 (1988), http://www.azsos.gov/sites/azsos.gov/files/pubpam88.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YFN4-FKSP], but later returned to its original language by ARIZ. 
PROPOSITION 100 (1992), https://www.azsos.gov/sites/azsos.gov/files/pubpam92.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W7F2-MNVU]. 
 235 MONT. CONST. art IV, § 5. 
 236 Oregon’s provision applies only “until otherwise provided by law.” OR. CONST. art 
II, § 16.  
 237 HAW. CONST. art II, § 4. 
 238 LA. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 239 N.D. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 240 PA. CONST. art. VII, § 14. 
 241 MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 242 MISS. CONST. art XII, § 249. 
 243 N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 244 VA. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 245 W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 12. 
 246 WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 12.  
 247 In Washington, the constitution requires registration only for cities and towns with 
more than 500 people, and allows the legislature discretion otherwise. WASH. CONST. art. 
VI, § 7. 
 248 MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 249 Interestingly, Texas’s constitution (written in 1876) originally barred voter 
registration; in 1891, it was amended to allow it, and in 1966, it was amended to require it. 
TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. VI, § 4 (“[N]o law shall ever be enacted requiring a registration 
of the voters of this State.”), first amended by S.J. Res. 19, 22nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 
1891) (permitting registration in larger cities), and then amended by Tex. H.R.J. Res. 13, 
59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1966) (making registration mandatory). 
 250 MISS. CONST. art XII, § 251. 
 251 VA. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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 Election Procedures: 
o Alabama lays out procedures for challenging the validity of votes 
and punishing voter fraud.252 
o Arkansas requires ballots that were unlawfully not counted 
initially to be counted after an election.253 
o Louisiana requires that all ballots be counted publicly.254 
 Other: 
o Hawaii requires that primaries precede general elections by forty-
five days or more.255 
o Georgia bars voters who did not vote in a general election from 
voting in any subsequent runoff.256 
o Michigan bars laws that permit partisan candidates to have “ballot 
designations.”257  
  
                                                                                                                     
 252 ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 185 (“Any elector whose right to vote shall be challenged 
for any legal cause before an election officer, shall be required to swear or affirm that the 
matter of the challenge is untrue before his vote shall be received, and anyone who 
willfully swears or affirms falsely thereto, shall be guilty of perjury, and upon conviction 
thereof shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five 
years.”). 
 253 ARK. CONST. art. III, § 11. 
 254 LA. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 255 HAW. CONST. art II, § 8. 
 256 GA. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 257 MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
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V. TABLES 
Table 1: Redistricting Commissions and Other Non-Legislative Redistricting 
Mechanisms, by State 




























































Yes Yes No 
                                                                                                                     
 258 An Act Establishing a Reapportionment Commission, ch. 100, § 1, 2011 R.I. Pub. 
Laws 359, 359–60; An Act Establishing a Reapportionment Commission, ch. 106, § 1, 
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 388, 388–89. 
 259 ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. III, § 1-A. 
 260 Va. Exec. Order No. 31 (Jan. 10, 2011). 
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 261 N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5-b. 
 262 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 42.1–42.6 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015). 
 263 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206(2) (2008 & Supp. 2015). 
 264 See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (West 2006). 
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 265 See CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6; CONN. QUESTION 4 (1976), 
http://www.sots.ct.gov/sots/lib/sots/electionservices/statementofvote_pdfs/1976_sov.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L7J7-DBAJ]. 
 266 See N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2; N.J. PUBLIC QUESTION 1 (1995), 
http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/election-results/1995-general-election-public-questions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8C2Q-4WA7]. 
 267 See IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; IDAHO S.J. RES. 105 (1994), 
https://www.legislature.idaho.gov/redistricting/1993SJR105.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW94-R5AM]. 
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 268 See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; WASH. S.J. RES. 103 (1983), 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/Voters’%20Pamphlet%201983.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Y7VQ-B4CU]. 
 269 See HAW. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 9. 
 270 See MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; MONT. LEGIS. COUNCIL, supra note 154, at 7–8. 
 271 See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; CAL. PROPOSITION 11 (2008), 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/initiatives/i746_07-0077_Initiative.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z6S-
ZAQ4]. 
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 272 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1; ARIZ. PROPOSITION 106 (2000), 
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2000/Info/pubpamphlet/English/prop106.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BNW8-ULYG]. 
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4 State party chairs (None) 
1 Other members 
Have not held 
political office in the 







Will not run for 
legislature or 
Congress for the next 






leaders Do not currently hold 
political office 






leaders Do not currently hold 
political office 







Have not held 
political office in the 












Have not held 
political office or 
done political work 
in the last three years 
1 Other members 
                                                                                                                     
 273 N.J. CONST. art II, § 2. 
 274 HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 275 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2). 
 276 MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2)–(4). 
 277 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(2)–(3). 
 278 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1(3). 


















Members and their 
immediate families 
have not held 
political office, done 
political work, or 
made large campaign 
contributions in the 
last ten years 
6 
Other members, 
from same pool 
as original eight 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 279 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c). 
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Source of Current Constitutional Provision Count 
Yes 
Original provision 36 
Amendment (previously had original 
provision) 
7 
Amendment (no original provision) 1 
No 
None (previously had original provision) 1 
None (no original provision) 5 
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Table 4: State Constitutional Provisions Governing Use of Ballots and/or 
Secrecy of Voting 







ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177 
(“Where . . . federal law requires elections 
for public office . . . the right of individuals 
to vote by secret ballot shall be 
guaranteed.”), as amended by ALA. CONST. 
amend. 865. 
 
Original Provision: ALA. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 179 (“All elections by the people shall be 
by ballot, and all elections by persons in a 
representative capacity shall be viva 





ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 3 (“Secrecy of 




ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“All elections 
by the people shall be by ballot, or by such 
other method as may be prescribed by law; 








ARK. CONST. amend. 50, § 2 (“All 
elections by the people shall be by ballot or 
by voting machines which insure the 
secrecy of individual votes.”). 
 
Original Provision: ARK. CONST. art III, 
§ 3 (“All elections by the people shall be 
by ballot . . . . The election officers shall be 
sworn or affirmed not to disclose how any 
elector shall have voted, unless required to 
do so as witnesses in a judicial proceeding, 
or a proceeding to contest an election.”), 
repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 50, § 1. 
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CAL. CONST. art II, § 7 (“Voting shall be 
secret.”). 
 
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5 (“All elections by 





COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (“All elections 




CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“In all elections 
of officers of the state, or members of the 
general assembly, the votes of the electors 
shall be by ballot, either written or printed, 
except that voting machines or other 
mechanical devices for voting may be used 
in all elections in the state . . . . The right of 
secret voting shall be preserved.”) 





DEL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The general 




FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (“All elections by 
the people shall be by direct and secret 
vote.”) (amended without changing 




GA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Elections by the 




HAW. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“Secrecy of 




IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 1 (“All elections 
by the people must be by ballot. An 
absolutely secret ballot is hereby 




ILL. CONST. art. III, § 4 (“The General 
Assembly by law shall . . . insure secrecy 
of voting . . . .”). 
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IND. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“All elections by 
the People shall be by ballot; and all 
elections by the General Assembly, or by 




IOWA CONST. art. II, § 6 (“All elections by 




KAN. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“All elections by 
the people shall be by ballot or voting 





KY. CONST. § 147 (“In all elections by 
persons in a representative capacity, the 
voting shall be viva voce and made a 
matter of record; but all elections by the 
people shall be by secret official ballot, 
furnished by public authority to the voters 
at the polls, and marked by each voter in 
private at the polls, and then and there 
deposited . . . .”) (amended without 




LA. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (“In all elections by 
the people, voting shall be by secret 
ballot. . . . In all elections by persons in a 
representative capacity, voting shall be 
viva-voce.”). 
 
Also, state’s first constitution contained 
similar provision: LA. CONST. of 1812, art. 
VI, § 13 (“In all elections by the people, 
and also by the Senate and House of 
Representatives jointly or separately, the 




ME. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“[E]lections shall 




MD. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All elections shall 
be by ballot.”) (amended without changing 
relevant language 2008). 
Massachusetts [None]  
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MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The legislature 
shall enact laws . . . to preserve the secrecy 




MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (“All elections 
shall be by ballot except for such town 





MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 240 (“All 





MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“All elections 
by the people shall be by ballot or by any 




MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“All elections 




NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“All votes shall 




NEV. CONST. art. II, § 5 (“All elections by 
the people shall be by ballot, and all 
elections by the Legislature, or by either 








N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (“All elections 
shall be by ballot.”). 
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N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 7 (“All elections by 
the citizens, except for such town officers 
as may by law be directed to be otherwise 
chosen, shall be by ballot, or by such other 
method as may be prescribed by law, 
provided that secrecy in voting be 
preserved.”). 
 
Original Provision: N.Y. CONST. of 1894, 
art. II, § 5 (“All elections by the citizens, 
except for such town officers as may by 
law be directed to be otherwise chosen, 





N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“All elections by 
the people shall be by ballot, and all 







N.D. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative 
assembly shall provide by law for secrecy 
in voting . . . .”). 
 





OHIO CONST. art. V, § 2 (“All elections 







Original Provision: OKLA. CONST. of 
1907, art. III, § 6 (“In all elections by the 
people the vote shall be by ballot . . . .”) 
(amended 1978).  
 
The Constitution was amended in 1978 to 
remove relevant language. See OKLA. 
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OR. CONST. art. II, § 15 (“In all elections 
by the Legislative Assembly, or by either 
branch thereof, votes shall be given openly 
or viva voce, and not by ballot, forever; 
and in all elections by the people, votes 
shall be given openly, or viva voce, until 





PA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (“All elections by 
the citizens shall be by ballot or by such 
other method as may be prescribed by law; 
Provided, That secrecy in voting be 
preserved.”). 
 
Also, state’s first constitution contained 
similar provision: PA. CONST. of 1790, art. 
III, § 2 (“All elections shall be by ballot, 
except those by persons in their 
representative capacities, who shall vote 
viva voce.”). 








S.C. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“All elections by 
the people shall be by secret ballot . . . .”). 
 
Original Provision: S.C. CONST. art. II, § 1 
(“All elections by the people shall be by 







S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (“The legislature 
shall by law . . . insure secrecy in 
voting . . . .”). 
 
S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (“All votes shall 
be by ballot . . . .”) (amended 1974). 
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TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“In all elections 
to be made by the General Assembly, the 
members thereof shall vote viva voce, and 
their votes shall be entered on the journal. 
All other elections shall be by ballot.”). 
 
Also, state’s first constitution contained 
similar provision: TENN. CONST. of 1796, 





TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (“In all elections 
by the people, the vote shall be by 







UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 8 (“All 
elections . . . shall be by secret ballot.”). 
The amendment added language requiring 
union elections to be by secret ballot as 
well. 
 
Original Provision: UTAH CONST. art. IV, 
§ 8 (“All elections shall be by secret 
ballot.”) (amended 2011). 




VA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“In elections by the 
people . . . [v]oting shall be by ballot or by 
machines for receiving, recording, and 
counting votes cast. . . . Secrecy in casting 
votes shall be maintained . . . .”) (amended 




WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“All elections 
shall be by ballot. The legislature shall 
provide for such method of voting as will 
secure to every elector absolute secrecy in 




W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“In all 
elections by the people, the mode of voting 
shall be by ballot; but the voter shall be left 
free to vote by either open, sealed or secret 
ballot, as he may elect.”). 
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WIS. CONST. art III, § 3 (“All votes shall be 
by secret ballot”). 
 
Original Provision: WIS. CONST. art. III, 
§ 3 (“All votes shall be given by ballot, 
except for such township officers as may 
by law be directed or allowed to be 




WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (“All elections 
shall be by ballot. . . . All voters shall be 
guaranteed absolute privacy in the 
preparation of their ballots, and the secrecy 
of the ballot shall be made compulsory.”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION: A REPUBLICAN GUARANTEE CLAUSE CASE BY A 
DIFFERENT NAME 
Given the collateral damage that a restrictive reading of the Elections 
Clause would cause, it is at least worth entertaining the possibility that 
controversies like the one involving the AIRC should be considered 
nonjusticiable political questions. Of course, because the Court has already 
adjudicated several cases under the Clause, the prospects of using the AIRC 
case to reverse course seemed remote. But the Pandora’s Box opened by 
engaging with the knotty questions posed by the ISLD, at a minimum, should 
caution against aggressive judicial intervention. 
A baseline consideration absent from the debate over the Elections Clause 
is whether the Constitution requires a state to have a legislature at all. 
Although the word “Legislature” appears sixteen times in the Constitution, no 
provision requires that each state have a legislature. The Republican Guarantee 
Clause states that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government.”280 But the Court has long held that 
challenges under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political 
questions—both in the specific context of adjudicating whether direct 
democracy violated the clause,281 as well as whether the state of Rhode Island 
had a legitimate government.282 Indeed, the precise reason the one-person, 
one-vote rule emerged from the Equal Protection Clause was that the Court 
had turned back challenges to malapportioned redistricting plans based on the 
Guarantee Clause.283 Finally, as mentioned above, the Court reiterated this 
position in the precedent most relevant to the AIRC case, Davis v. 
Hildebrant.284 There, the Court rejected the notion that the use of a 
referendum to overturn a legislatively enacted congressional redistricting plan 
violated either the Elections Clause or the Republican Guarantee Clause.285 
                                                                                                                     
 280 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1. 
 281 Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 138 (1912). 
 282 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 33–34 (1849). 
 283 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (“We hold that the claim pleaded here 
neither rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability is therefore 
not foreclosed by our decisions of cases involving that clause.”); Colegrove v. Green, 328 
U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (“Violation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government 
in States cannot be challenged in the courts.”).  
 284 Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916). 
 285 See id. (“[The attack on the referendum] must rest upon the assumption that to 
include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power is to introduce a virus which 
destroys that power, which in effect annihilates representative government and causes a 
State where such condition exists to be not republican in form in violation of the guarantee 
of the Constitution. But the proposition and the argument disregard the settled rule that the 
question of whether that guarantee of the Constitution has been disregarded presents no 
justiciable controversy but involves the exercise by Congress of the authority vested in it 
by the Constitution.” (citation omitted)). 
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Many have urged the Court to provide a robust definition of a “Republican 
Form of Government”286 and become aggressively involved in questions of 
democratic design. Indeed, were it to do so, the Court not only might curb the 
excesses of the initiative process, but it could deal with any number of election 
controversies (e.g., partisan gerrymandering, voter identification, campaign 
finance) in a fashion that was not preoccupied, to the exclusion of all else, with 
discrimination, which the focus on the Equal Protection Clause inevitably 
requires. The decision to avoid those controversies, however, was based on the 
prescient prediction that doing so would place the Court in the most contested 
and partisan of constitutional disputes—ones in which the Court would be 
directly affecting winners and losers in elections. Perhaps the gravitation of 
such questions into equal protection jurisprudence (see, e.g., Bush v. Gore287) 
means that such a train has now fully left the station, so opening up one more 
constitutional clause as a door to litigation may prove inconsequential. The 
analysis above suggests, however, that aggressive judicial intervention here 
would not necessarily lead to more populist or “small d” democratic results.  
If election regulation through direct democracy is consistent with a 
republican form of government, it is consistent with a “Legislature” 
prescribing the “time, place and manner of holding” federal elections. Indeed, 
the widespread use of the initiative to do precisely that should weigh in the 
balance of its constitutionality. “The life of the law has not been logic,” Justice 
Holmes famously said, “it has been experience.”288 That over-quoted phrase 
may be most true in the field of election regulation. To the casual observer, the 
American experience with the law of democracy seems not only illogical, but, 
at times, downright bizarre. The Court was right to step back from the abyss 
the AIRC case presented. Existing jurisprudence provides ample opportunity 
for judicial mischief when it comes to election regulations. Opening up an 
entirely new area to litigation would have produced almost no tangible 
benefits, and the costs to self-government could have been substantial. 
                                                                                                                     
 286 See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican 
Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 22 (1993); Hans 
A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709, 710 
(1994); Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the Republic for Which It 
Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
1057, 1066–71 (1996). 
 287 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 288 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
